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 The Diffusion of Regulatory Oversight 
 Jonathan B.  Wiener 
 Th e idea of cost-benefi t analysis has been spreading internationally for centuries—
at least since an American named Benjamin Franklin wrote a letter in  to 
his British friend, Joseph Priestley, recommending that Priestley weigh the pros 
and cons of a diffi  cult decision in what Franklin dubbed a “moral or prudential 
algebra” (Franklin ) (more on this letter below). Several recent studies show 
that the use of benefi t-cost analysis (BCA), for both public projects and public 
regulation of private activities, is now unfolding in countries on every habitable 
continent around the world (Livermore and Revesz ; Quah and Toh ; 
De Francesco ; Livermore ; Cordova-Novion and Jacobzone ). Th is 
global diff usion of BCA is intermingled with the global diff usion of regulatory 
capitalism, in which privatized market actors are supervised by expert regulatory 
agencies (Levi-Faur ; Simmons et al. ), and with the international spread 
of ex ante regulatory precautions to anticipate and prevent risks despite uncer-
tainty (Wiener et al. ). 
 Th e spread of regulatory precautions to govern markets and risks, and the 
spread of BCA as an analytic method to evaluate public projects and regulatory 
policies, have led in turn to the global diff usion of institutional systems for regu-
latory oversight. Th is chapter addresses the diff usion of such regulatory oversight 
systems, which oft en employ BCA as a tool for policy evaluation (typically under 
the rubric of regulatory impact assessment, RIA). 
 Th e diff usion of regulatory oversight systems using RIA, closely following the 
diff usion of regulation and precaution, makes intuitive sense as a mechanism for 
accountability and guidance of regulatory power. But this pattern also challenges 
conventional claims. First, it shows that orthodox notions of discrete “national 
styles of regulation” (Vogel ) and early “legal origins” of modern regulation 
(la Porta et al. ) are belied or at least markedly eroded by the modern reality of 
the exchange of ideas across complex interconnected and increasingly hybrid reg-
ulatory systems. History matters, but it is not destiny; modern regulatory systems 
exist in global networks and evolve through learning, borrowing, and hybridi-
zation (Levi-Faur ; Wiener et al. ). Second, precaution and RIA/BCA, 
though oft en portrayed as antagonists, are better understood as complementary 
components of a deeper trend: the diff usion of regulatory foresight. Both precau-
tion and RIA are eff orts to forecast the future consequences of current choices. 
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Such regulatory foresight is increasingly demanded as societies prosper and, iron-
ically, as they become safer. 
 Both hybridization and foresight are essential strategies for risk management 
in a changing world. To make the most of these strategies, this chapter suggests, we 
should consciously construct a global policy laboratory—which in turn involves a 
bit of regulatory hindsight. 
 Regulatory Oversight 
 Regulations can be necessary to correct market failures such as externalities (e.g., 
health, safety, and environmental risks), asymmetric information, and market 
power. Regulation can help solve such social problems, but it can also induce its 
own problems, including compliance costs, inhibition of innovation, ancillary 
risks, and rent-seeking. As a result, wherever states deploy regulation, demand 
arises for oversight of the regulatory system to reduce the costs and side eff ects 
of regulation, increase the benefi ts of regulation, and promote transparency and 
accountability. 
 Regulatory oversight systems go further than academic or episodic 
project-oriented BCA by creating institutions for broad application of RIA (typ-
ically using BCA) to evaluate all signifi cant regulatory actions, with a body to 
review the RIAs prepared by regulatory agencies (OECD a). Th e function 
of regulatory oversight may be located in the judiciary (judicial review of admin-
istrative agency action), the executive (center-of-government regulatory review, 
typically in the presidency or head of government, sometimes in an agency or a 
multiagency council), the legislature (an expert body assisting the legislature, or 
legislative review of administrative action), or an independent entity (such as a 
neutral review board, auditor, or ombudsman). 
 A “regulatory oversight body” (ROB) typically means a centralized govern-
ment unit atop the executive hierarchy that uses expertise to supervise regulatory 
action by agencies (Lindseth, Aman, and Raul ; Wiener and Alemanno ; 
Cordova-Novion and Jacobzone ). ROBs provide both expertise (through 
expert staff  and analytic methods) and political accountability (such as to the pres-
ident or prime minister); these objectives may be mutually reinforcing but may 
pose tensions at times (Shapiro ). 
 ROBs may have a variety of functions and powers, including commenting on 
(and assisting in improving) the quality of an agency’s RIA; constraining agency 
action when an RIA is deemed inadequate or when the benefi ts of an agency’s 
proposed regulation do not justify the costs; calling on agencies to review existing 
regulations for their benefi ts and costs; prompting agency action when BCA iden-
tifi es a socially promising regulation that agencies are not yet promulgating; and 
fostering transparency in the reporting of regulatory impacts. And ROBs’ func-
tions and powers may diff er across polities, in part because ROBs may be located 
in diff erent branches or units of diff erent constitutional structures accorded dif-
ferent roles and powers, such as parliamentary versus presidential systems. A key 
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point here is that the ROB’s authority to guide regulatory decision-making will 
depend on its institutional role among the branches or power centers of govern-
ment (Wiener and Alemanno ). (For more detailed analyses of ROBs’ legal 
bases, functions, powers, and constitutional structures, see Wiener and Alemanno 
; Cordova-Novion and Jacobzone ). 
 For example, in the United States, the Offi  ce of Information and Regulatory 
Aff airs (OIRA), created in , located within the Offi  ce of Management and 
Budget (OMB) in the Executive Offi  ce of the President, performs all of these func-
tions pursuant to a series of executive orders issued by several presidents of both 
political parties (notably Jimmy Carter’s Executive Order , of , preced-
ing OIRA; Ronald Reagan’s Executive Order , of ; and Bill Clinton’s 
Executive Order , of , which remains in force today and has been 
extended by Barack Obama’s Executive Orders , and , of , and 
, of May ). OIRA regularly exercises its authority to “return” agency reg-
ulatory proposals that do not meet the analytic and net benefi ts criteria set forth 
in the executive order, and OIRA has occasionally sent a “prompt” to agencies to 
pursue regulations that promise net benefi ts (Graham ; Revesz and Livermore 
). BCA had been employed in the United States to assess public projects for 
decades before the creation of OIRA, including for fl ood control projects and mil-
itary procurement (Quah and Toh ). Following the wave of regulatory legisla-
tion and the expansion of the administrative state during the s and s, the 
advent of RIA in the s and OIRA review in the s created an institutional 
structure for regulatory oversight—a system that has been reaffi  rmed in a biparti-
san consensus across every subsequent presidential administration (Kagan ; 
Wiener and Alemanno ). Many of the U.S. member states have also adopted 
RIA systems (Schwartz ). But in the United States, RIAs and OIRA review 
are evaluations of agency rulemakings—agency actions to implement authority 
delegated by the legislature through statutes—not appraisals of the bills initially 
proposed in the legislature. 
 In the European Union, impact assessment was launched by the Better 
Regulation Initiative over – (Wiener ), and the EU Impact 
Assessment Board (IAB) was then created in . Th e IAB, a fi ve-member 
board, is located within the Secretariat General in the Presidency of the European 
Commission. It began as a commenter on RIA quality and has grown to play 
a wider role (Wiener and Alemanno ). Since , the president of the 
European Commission has required new regulatory proposals to obtain a positive 
opinion from the IAB before going forward (European Commission , –), 
giving the IAB an authority more akin to OIRA’s “return letter” than the IAB had 
previously had. Strikingly, while the IAB returned for “resubmission” only  per-
cent of regulatory proposals in , by  it was returning  percent (and 
then  percent in , perhaps indicating a plateau) (European Commission 
, fi g. ). And in the EU, impact assessment and IAB review includes evalua-
tions of proposals for legislation—that is, proposals by the Commission that will 
be forwarded to the European Parliament and Council. Similarly, in France, the 
new Organic Law of April ,  (Loi organique n° – du  avril  
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST-PROOF, 10/20/12, NEWGEN
08_Livemore_Ch08.indd   125 10/20/2012   2:49:24 AM
Institutional Matters126
relative  à l’application des articles –,  et  de la Constitution) requires an 
impact analysis reviewed by the Conseil d’Etat before a bill can be proposed to 
the National Assembly. 
 Diffusion 
 Regulatory oversight is now being “diff used throughout the globe” (Radaelli 
and De Francesco ). Just as the number of regulatory agencies worldwide 
has grown, especially rapidly since about  (Levi-Faur , fi g. .), so the 
number of ROBs has also grown over that period. Institutions for regulatory over-
sight have spread from about half of the twenty-seven OECD members in , 
to virtually all of the now thirty-one OECD members in  (Cordova-Novion 
and Jacobzone , fi g. ) and to virtually all EU members (De Francesco ). 
Mechanisms for regulatory oversight are also appearing in international organiza-
tions (see the chapter by Alberto Alemanno in this volume). 
 Th e creation in  of the ROB at the EU level, the IAB, followed at least fi ve 
years of development of an RIA system—starting with the EU’s Better Regulation 
initiative and its impact assessment guidelines (Wiener ). Additional exam-
ples of ROBs in OECD member states include the Productivity Commission and 
the Offi  ce of Best Practice Regulation (OBPR) in Australia (where RIA has been 
employed since ); the Simplifi cation and Better Regulation Unit in Denmark; 
the function of the Conseil d’Etat in supervising impact analyses pursuant to the 
Organic Law of April , , in France; the Administrative Burdens Board in the 
Netherlands; the Better Regulation Unit in Germany; the Administrative Evaluation 
Bureau in Japan; the Comisi ó n Federal de Mejora Regulatoria (COFEMER) in 
Mexico; the Regulatory Reform Committee (RRC) and Regulatory Reform Bureau 
in South Korea; and the Better Regulation Executive and associated regulatory 
committees in the United Kingdom (a survey is provided in Cordova-Novion and 
Jacobzone ). In South Korea, spurred by an economic crisis in the s, the 
government enacted the Basic Act on Administrative Regulations in , and 
the RRC then undertook an extensive review of existing regulations resulting in 
thousands of revisions and repeals, as well as RRC oversight of RIAs for newly 
proposed regulations (Truen ; Cordova-Novion and Jacobzone ). In 
Chile, the economic evaluation requirement for environmental regulations (pur-
suant to Law , of ) has been supplemented by an RIA process created in 
Law , of , though it remains unclear whether a ROB will supervise this 
RIA process (OECD ). Related systems exist or are being developed in other 
OECD members, including New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, and Turkey 
(Cordova-Novion and Jacobzone ). 
 We can expect the spread of ROBs using RIA, and the collaborative dialogue 
among those institutions, to continue. In March , the OECD issued a major 
set of twelve recommendations to all governments, including on evaluating reg-
ulatory quality, using RIA for both ex ante (prospective) and ex post (retrospec-
tive) regulatory review, creating ROBs, and engaging in international regulatory 
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cooperation (OECD ). In May , President Obama issued Executive Order 
, to promote international regulatory cooperation. 
 Th e legal bases, constitutional structures, and powers of these ROBs diff er 
across countries. Just more than half (so far) of the ROBs in the OECD mem-
ber states are empowered to review agency RIAs (Cordova-Novion and Jacobzone 
, fi g. ). Some, like US OIRA, review agencies’ proposed regulations to imple-
ment statutes already enacted by the legislature; others, like the EU IAB, review 
initial proposals for legislation (usually within the branch of government that ini-
tiates such proposals); this diff erence in structure entails diff erences in interbranch 
(executive vs. legislative) relations over policymaking and power (Wiener and 
Alemanno ). Th e U.S. OIRA, the EU IAB, the OBPR in Australia, the RRC in 
Korea, and COFEMER in Mexico must generally give a positive opinion for a pro-
posed regulation to proceed, or they have the power to return regulatory proposals 
(though there are exceptions in each system) (Cordova-Novion and Jacobzone 
, table A.). Many or all ROBs can request analytic improvements in a draft  
RIA. Japan’s Administrative Evaluation Bureau, the Administrative Burdens board 
in the Netherlands, and Germany’s Better Regulation Unit can review the quality 
of RIAs but do not return proposed regulations (Cordova-Novion and Jacobzone 
, table A.). Review of the existing stock of regulations (also known as ex post, 
retrospective, or “lookback” review) is being emphasized in the Australian regu-
latory oversight system (Australian Productivity Commission ) and in the 
United States (under Executive Order , issued in ). 
 RIA and ROBs are also beginning to spread beyond the OECD to developing 
countries (Truen ; World Bank Group ; Jacobs ; Kirkpatrick and 
Zhang ). In many countries, as was the case in the United States and EU, the 
development of BCA as an analytic exercise by academics and project-funding 
agencies has preceded the creation of governmental RIA systems and the estab-
lishment of ROBs to supervise regulation. Some developing countries are now 
moving to adopt formal systems of RIA and to establish ROBs. 
 Countries seeking to join the EU are adopting RIA: Serbia adopted Rules 
of Procedure requiring RIA for new legislation in , aft er having established 
a Council for Regulatory Reform and Quality Control in  (OECD b, 
); and Croatia required RIA beginning in  and in  created an RIA 
Coordination Offi  ce (OECD b, –). But Bulgaria has hesitated to adopt 
RIA, despite internal support (Truen ). Turkey has adopted signifi cant admin-
istrative reforms, partly in response to encouragement from the EU and partly for 
domestic reasons, but apparently has not yet instituted RIA (Sezen ). 
 Elsewhere, in Russia in  and South Africa in , the OECD held infor-
mational workshops on RIA. South Africa has moved ahead to develop a pilot 
RIA process supported by the Cabinet Offi  ce (Truen ). RIA was adopted for 
environmental regulations in Uganda in  (UNEP ), and in Kenya in  
(World Bank Group ). In Brazil, the Secretariat of Economic Monitoring 
(SEAE) has recently adopted RIA for some sectors (OECD ), although some 
observers predict that a broader RIA process in Brazil may turn out to be sig-
nifi cantly infl uenced by political forces (Peci and Sobral ). Th e use of BCA 
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has also become widespread across numerous countries in Asia (Quah and Toh 
, off ering numerous case studies). BCA for both project evaluation and regu-
latory policy evaluation has been employed in China and India (Livermore ), 
although the development of an RIA process for China’s regulatory agencies has 
lagged (Hu ). Th e Philippines has an RIA process supervised by its National 
Economic and Development Authority, and is considering establishing an Offi  ce 
of Best Regulatory Practice to provide expert oversight and advice on this RIA 
process (Bird, Plunkett, and Bosworth ). Vietnam adopted RIA in –, 
with support from its Administrative Procedure Control Agency, the German 
GTZ, and the USAID’s Vietnam Competitiveness Initiative (PERQ ; Truen 
); an RIA is now required in Vietnam before a bill may be presented to the 
National Assembly (Truen ). 
 More generally, several key concepts in environmental law and risk regula-
tion have experienced considerable diff usion and borrowing around the world, 
including BCA through RIA, environmental impact assessment (EIA), emissions 
trading (cap and trade), public participation and access to government informa-
tion, and information disclosure requirements on industry (Busch and Jorgens 
; Wiener and Richman ; Ellerman et al. ; Wiener et al. ; Sand 
). 
 Diff usion is a multifaceted concept of the spread of ideas (Levi-Faur ). 
Ideas can spread across numerous nodes in complex networks, including among 
individuals, groups, civil society, business coalitions, political parties, regions, 
agencies, countries, and international organizations (Lazer ). And ideas may 
evolve as they spread and be employed diff erently in diff erent institutional set-
tings. Th e literature on the diff usion of policy ideas is large (see generally Rose 
; Dolowitz and Marsh ; James and Lodge ; Elkins and Simmons 
; Berry and Berry ). Closely related concepts of diff usion as an evolu-
tionary process have been developed in sociology (Hagerstrand ), econom-
ics (Rogers ), law (Sand ; Watson ; Tushnet ), political science 
(Walker ; Lazer ; Weyland ; Simmons et al. ), biology (Arnold 
; Grant ; Deakin ), and history of science (Galison ). Legal 
scholars have borrowed from biologists the notion of “memes” as the unit, and 
counterpart of genes, in the evolution of ideas (Dawkins ; Deakin ). In 
biology, evolution was fi rst understood to occur through competition among indi-
viduals within a species; later, through fi eld studies, biologists began to appreciate 
that evolution also occurs through the exchange of genetic material across species 
via interbreeding (called “hybridization”) (Arnold ; Grant ). Likewise, in 
law, evolution was initially understood to occur through competition among indi-
vidual rules within a legal system (Priest ; Elliott ; Farber ; but for 
doubts about the effi  ciency of such legal evolution, see Hadfi eld ; Roe ); 
later, through the equivalent of fi eld studies, legal scholars came to appreciate that 
legal evolution also occurs through the exchange of legal concepts across legal 
systems via borrowing (Watson ; Elliott ; Wiener ; Deakin ; 
Wiener ), also called “hybridization” (Wiener , –; Wiener ; 
Wiener et al. , –; Delmas-Marty , –). 
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST-PROOF, 10/20/12, NEWGEN
08_Livemore_Ch08.indd   128 10/20/2012   2:49:24 AM
 Th e Diff usion of Regulatory Oversight 129
 Th ere are reasons to expect the diff usion of regulatory policy approaches to 
have increased in recent years. Th e reality of contemporary international relations 
and information technology is a world of interconnectedness: networks and the 
transnational diff usion of ideas. Slaughter (, ) argues:
 We live in a networked world . . . .In this world, the measure of power is con-
nectedness . . . .Th e twentieth-century world was, at least in terms of geopoli-
tics, a billiard-ball world, described by the political scientist Arnold Wolfers 
as a system of self-contained states colliding with one another . . . .Th e emerg-
ing networked world of the twenty-fi rst century, however, exists above the 
state, below the state, and through the state. 
 Interconnectedness enables the more fl uid spread of ideas, and thereby off ers 
increased opportunities to borrow and collaborate on policy solutions (Lazer 
). Regulatory ideas are increasingly being borrowed across the Atlantic, and 
worldwide, in an evolving web of global administrative law (Kingsbury et al. ; 
Rose-Ackerman and Lindseth ). Levi-Faur (, ) writes:
 [T]he new order [of regulatory capitalism] is diff used rather than reproduced 
independently as a discrete event in each country and sector. Diff usion is a 
refl ection of an increasingly interdependent world. Beyond economic inter-
dependencies, there is a growth of “horizontal” channels of diff usion and an 
increase in the export and import of institutions and knowledge. 
 But the fact that we observe similar legal rules, policies, or institutions arising 
in multiple places does not necessarily mean that the identical idea has been (or 
should be) adopted in every place. Th ere may be variation in the content of the 
idea as it is adopted in diff erent places. RIA adopted in one country may have a dif-
ferent institutional role and analytic content than RIA adopted in other countries 
(Radaelli ; Wiener and Alemanno ). Careful comparison of the elements 
of each RIA system and ROB will be helpful in distinguishing what precisely was 
borrowed from where. And even if the idea is essentially the same in each place 
we observe it arising, that does not necessarily mean that the idea was learned 
and eagerly borrowed by one place from another; it might, for example, have been 
imposed coercively by a colonial power (Elkins and Simmons ; Simmons et 
al. ), or imitated unthinkingly as a passing fad (Lazer ), or arisen inde-
pendently in each place in response to similar but independent conditions (as in 
“convergent evolution” and related concepts in biology, see Losos ). Dobbin, 
Simmons, and Garrett (, –) warn: 
 One weakness of many of the studies in this arena is that they take sim-
ple diff usion to be evidence of learning, without looking at whether there 
was evidence of the effi  cacy of a policy innovation before second- and 
third- movers adopted it . . . .[R]ational learning theory implies a kind of 
cost-benefi t analysis . . . .People may draw lessons by observing the eff ects of 
policies other countries adopt, and they may engage in Bayesian updating, 
in which they constantly add new bits of evidence to the existing knowledge 
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base . . . the overarching theme here is that countries learn to pursue eff ective 
policies. 
 A similar point is that successful legal borrowing involves a kind of cost-benefi t cal-
culus: an evaluation of policies and institutions in other jurisdictions and a decision 
to borrow or translate the version that appears most promising for one’s own needs 
(Wiener ; Levi-Faur ; Stone ). Th is kind of calculus—essentially what 
Benjamin Franklin advised—may be applied in horizontal legal borrowing across 
countries and in vertical legal borrowing across local, national, and international 
levels of governance (Wiener ; Levi-Faur ; Ovodenko and Keohane ). 
 Th e borrowing calculus that drives the diff usion of RIA and ROBs is undoubt-
edly based on a combination of factors. One source appears to be a demand, at 
least among presidents, to manage the growing regulatory state. Consider the 
adoption of the U.S. Administrative Procedure Act in  following the New 
Deal, and the executive orders on regulatory review in the s and s fol-
lowing the burst of regulatory legislation of the preceding decade. Similarly, in 
Europe, Better Regulation and the IAB arose aft er the growth of EU regulation in 
the s. A similar pattern may be at work in other countries. Th e presidential 
impetus to manage the regulatory state through BCA, RIA, and ROBs can focus on 
reducing costs and cutting red tape, but it can also seek to increase social net ben-
efi ts through promotion of desirable new regulations (Kagan ; Graham ; 
Revesz and Livermore ). In addition, economic crises and fears about eco-
nomic competitiveness appear to spur regulatory reform eff orts—for example, in 
the United States aft er the stagfl ation of the late s, in Europe with the Lisbon 
Agenda of jobs and growth since , and in Korea and Mexico aft er economic 
crises in the s (Cordova-Novion and Jacobzone , Truen ). Looking 
ahead, RIA and ROBs will be more likely to be adopted if their methods can be 
made less costly and more benefi cial, especially in lower-income countries facing 
constraints on administrative capacity. 
 Evidence is accumulating that policy approaches to RIA and regulatory 
oversight have actually been borrowed, based on learning about effi  cacy, across 
countries. Research on the emergence of “global administrative law” refl ects 
both hybridization and the role of purposive actors consciously borrowing ideas 
(Kingsbury et al. ). Th ere is clearly an epistemic community of experts shar-
ing experiences about RIA and ROBs across countries; examples include Radaelli 
(), Renda (), Jacobs (), Cordova-Novion and Jacobzone (), 
Quah and Toh (), Truen (), Wiener (), Wiener and Alemanno 
(), and this volume itself. Th e OECD has been a major supplier of information 
and encouragement on regulatory quality improvement not only in OECD mem-
ber states but around the world, as have the overseas development agencies of key 
countries like the United States and Germany. Direct testimonial evidence is also 
available; consider this express account of borrowing in the EU Better Regulation 
initiative by the prime minister of Ireland:
 Better Regulation is a core theme of our EU Presidency and featured promi-
nently at the recent Spring Economic Council . . . .Th ere is a long tradition in 
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST-PROOF, 10/20/12, NEWGEN
08_Livemore_Ch08.indd   130 10/20/2012   2:49:25 AM
 Th e Diff usion of Regulatory Oversight 131
American Public Administration of focusing on the quality and impact of 
regulation. Many of the policies, institutions, and tools that support Better 
Regulation have their origins in the U.S.A . . . .Th ere is much that we have 
learned from the United States in relation to regulatory management and, 
through occasions like this, much that we can continue to learn . . . .We hope 
too that there will be shared learning. While we in the European Union are 
newer to the game, I hope that we have moved beyond our rookie season! Th e 
Union is making up ground quickly in respect of Better Regulation. Th is is as 
it should be. Th ere is a deeper understanding within the European Institutions 
and Member States of the need for regulatory reform. 
—Ahern  
 A further kind of evidence is statistical analysis of the timing and location of the 
adoption of RIA across countries. De Francesco () tested the historical pattern 
for the infl uence of several plausible variables. He found that trade relations and 
the country’s legal system family were not signifi cant predictors of RIA adoption; 
prior adoption of other information access laws helped predict RIA adoption; the 
OECD was important more for its information-sharing facility than for its nudg-
ing eff orts; and the most infl uential factor in adoption of RIA, in De Francesco’s 
model, was a country’s connection to transnational information networks off ering 
knowledge about regulatory innovations. 
 From National Styles to Regulatory Evolution 
 Th is pattern of diff usion has important implications for the comparison and evolu-
tion of law. Comparative law has traditionally presumed that important diff erences 
across countries are explained by discrete “national styles of regulation” (Vogel 
), “families” of legal systems (Zweigert and Kotz ), and early “legal origins” 
(La Porta et al. ). Th e economic analysis of “legal origins” (La Porta et al. ) 
draws broad generalizations about modern business rules by grouping countries 
into ancient legal families (English, French, German, etc.) (for critiques of the “legal 
origins” literature,  see Roe ; Curran ; Michaels ). Comparative law 
scholars have long recognized the possibilities for legal borrowing (Watson ), 
though oft en these transplants are individual doctrines, which may take root in the 
other system, or wither, or act as irritants—rare graft s from one discrete legal sys-
tem into another, whose reception in the second legal system is precarious. 
 But as Reimann () pointed out, extensive diff usion of legal ideas can 
erode the traditional categories of comparative law that are based on discrete 
national legal systems. Th e reality of major reforms of regulatory systems around 
the world, through BCA, RIA and ROBs, suggests that the model of stable discrete 
national styles of regulation, or early legal origins determining modern regulation, 
needs substantial rethinking. De Francesco () fi nds little or no evidence that 
national legal origin explains modern adoption of RIA. Vogel () concedes that 
national regulatory systems are far more open to wholesale change than he had 
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previously argued (Vogel ). Even the “legal origins” advocates allow (in pass-
ing) that “legal origins” may not account for regulations in what they label “new 
spheres of social control,” nor for regulations adopted following crisis events (La 
Porta et al. , , )—two of the leading characteristics of risk regulation 
and regulatory reform. 
 Diff usion and hybridization are powerful forces in regulatory evolution. 
Hybridization, in law as in biology, exchanges genes or memes, and thereby 
interpenetrates the boundaries of “species,” “systems,” “families,” and “styles.” 
Hybridization creates hybrid off spring that are neither convergent with nor diver-
gent from the prior populations, but new; they do not always succeed and are 
oft en less fi t, but they prosper when conditions change, opening niches for which 
the hybrids are well adapted. Undertaking both a dozen qualitative in-depth case 
studies and a quantitative analysis of a large-N sample of risks, Wiener et al. () 
fi nd that U.S. and European systems of risk regulation are undergoing substantial 
hybridization, exchanging ideas on many topics, including precaution, better reg-
ulation, impact assessment, regulatory oversight, economic incentive instruments, 
information disclosure, and other key elements. Risk regulation lives in an unfold-
ing network society (Castells ; Slaughter ; De Francesco ). Th e result 
is that it becomes increasingly diffi  cult to distinguish or generalize about separate 
regulatory systems with discrete characters. Countries and cultures caricatured as 
sharply diff erent turn out to share a great deal (Baldwin ). Amid such hybrid-
ization, claims of discrete national legal systems or families become stereotypes of 
a bygone era (if it ever existed). 
 Th is does not mean that no comparisons can be made. (Such a claim would 
itself be a hasty generalization drawn from inadequate data.) Th e view that com-
parative law is impossible because legal systems are so intrinsically diff erent from 
each other that rules cannot be compared—what Siems (, , ) critiques as 
the “strong form” of the claim of the “end of comparative law”—is both self-ne-
gating (it depends on the very kind of sharp comparison that it purports to deny) 
and empirically unsupported (because the United States, Europe, and, increas-
ingly, other countries are sharing legal ideas, not veering off  on separate paths). As 
Hiram Chodosh has nicely shown, those who assert that “comparing apples and 
oranges” is impossible are committing three errors: fi rst, people do in fact compare 
apples and oranges at the grocery store every day (in terms of taste, color, shape, 
price, and so on); second, using the phrase “apples and oranges” itself requires a 
comparison between the two fruits (to deem them so diff erent); and third, such 
an assertion itself rests on a comparison between the degree of contrast between 
the two fruits and the degree of contrast between the other two items sought to be 
compared (Chodosh ). (Th is defense of comparison applies not only to com-
parative law but to critiques of BCA as well.) Comparisons can and must be made, 
but on the basis of much more systematic empirical study, rather than general-
izing to “national styles” based on a small and biased sample. Th e real tableau is a 
complex and evolving landscape that defi es easy generalization—the busy world 
depicted with evident aff ection by both Pieter Brueghel (a medieval European) 
and Richard Scarry (a more modern American). An improved understanding will 
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involve comparison of rules and institutions as modules or memes that can be 
exchanged across interconnected legal systems, rather than of categorical general-
izations about national legal systems or legal origins. 
 Regulatory Foresight 
 Many of the contemporary debates over BCA and RIA were foreseen, of course, by 
Benjamin Franklin. He wrote to his friend, the English scientist Joseph Priestley, 
about whether Priestley should accept a new job (Franklin ): 
 In the Aff air of so much Importance to you, wherein you ask my Advice, I 
cannot for want of suffi  cient Premises, advise you what to determine, but if 
you please I will tell you how. When those diffi  cult Cases occur, they are diffi  -
cult, chiefl y because while we have them under Consideration, all the Reasons 
pro and con are not present to the Mind at the same time; but sometimes one 
Set present themselves, and at other times another, the fi rst being out of Sight. 
Hence the various Purposes or Inclinations that alternately prevail, and the 
Uncertainty that perplexes us. 
 To get over this, my Way is, to divide half a Sheet of Paper by a Line into 
two Columns; writing over the one Pro, and over the other Con. Th en dur-
ing three or four Days Consideration, I put down under the diff erent heads 
short Hints of the diff erent Motives, that at diff erent Times occur to me, for 
or against the Measure. When I have thus got them all together in one View, 
I endeavour to estimate their respective Weights; and where I fi nd two, one 
on each side, that seem equal, I strike them both out. If I fi nd a Reason pro 
equal to some two Reasons con, I strike out the three. If I judge some two 
Reasons con, equal to some three Reasons pro, I strike out the fi ve; and thus 
proceeding I fi nd at length where the Ballance lies; and if aft er a Day or two 
of farther consideration, nothing new that is of Importance occurs on either 
side, I come to a Determination accordingly. And, tho’ the Weight of Reasons 
cannot be taken with the Precision of Algebraic Quantities, yet, when each is 
thus considered, separately and comparatively, and the whole lies before me, 
I think I can judge better, and am less liable to make a rash Step; and in fact I 
have found great Advantage from this kind of Equation, in what may be called 
Moral or Prudential Algebra. 
 Franklin appears to have anticipated so many core aspects of BCA and RIA: the 
pitfalls of neglecting important impacts; the need for a structured approach to iden-
tifying and weighing the pros and cons; the inevitability of uncertainty; the need to 
“estimate their respective weights” but the inability to achieve mathematical preci-
sion (yet still an “Equation . . . Algebra”); the issue of commensurability (crossing out 
like items); the avowedly normative (“moral or prudential”) exercise; the use of BCA 
as a tool to help us “judge better,” not an arithmetic rule; the cognitive approach to 
BCA as a tool to get all key aspects (“the whole”) to appear “present to the Mind at 
the same time”; the behavioral role of BCA as a tool to avoid “a rash Step.” 
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 Th e letter itself illustrates the transatlantic diff usion of BCA via epistemic 
communities. It also records the diff usion of BCA preceding the establishment of 
RIA and ROBs. Franklin wrote to Priestley, and Priestley was in communication 
with Jeremy Bentham, who later wrote that he learned key elements of utilitarian-
ism from Priestley (Bentham ); at least one historian suggests that Bentham 
got the idea of dividing and weighing the pros and cons from Franklin (Viner , 
), though it is diffi  cult to fi nd evidence that Franklin and Bentham communi-
cated directly (perhaps through Priestley). An intriguing additional possibility, dif-
fi cult to document, is that Franklin, Priestley, and Bentham infl uenced the French 
engineer-economist Jules Dupuit, who developed the mathematics of marginal 
BCA in the early s (Ekelund and Hebert ). Among other possible con-
nections to Dupuit are that Franklin and Bentham each spent considerable time in 
Paris (Franklin was the American ambassador to France from  to ), and 
Bentham’s work was published in French by Etienne Dumont in the early s. 
(Franklin’s algebra was also later employed by Charles Darwin, to decide whether 
to marry, in ; a possible link is that Franklin had known Darwin’s grandfa-
thers, Erasmus Darwin and Josiah Wedgwood.) Franklin also helped send French 
engineers to America to assist with the Revolutionary War—a role that soon aft er 
contributed to the formation of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, modeled on the 
French Corps des Ponts et Chauss é es, the group that included Jules Dupuit. And 
much later, of course, BCA was apparently fi rst applied in the U.S. government by 
the Army Corps of Engineers under the Flood Control Act of  (Quah and Toh 
; Hines ). 
 Th e foresight needed in regulation is not only Ben Franklin’s foresight about 
how to do BCA, but foresight about risks and regulatory impacts. In order to 
weigh the pros and cons, we need ways to foresee those pros and cons. Th at is the 
function of risk assessment, and of RIA. Foresight is also the ambition of precau-
tion. Although precaution and RIA are oft en portrayed as antagonists, they are 
better understood as complementary components of a deeper phenomenon: the 
diff usion of regulatory foresight. Both precaution and RIA are eff orts to forecast 
the future consequences of current choices. 
 Humans have a capacity to envision future scenarios, but these scenarios tend 
to be constructed in the brain out of fragments of our memories, and so are partly 
rooted in what is mentally available (Gilbert and Wilson ; Schachter, Addis, 
and Buckner ). Th is property of bounded foresight helps explain the obser-
vation that public risk perceptions are oft en galvanized by “available” recent crisis 
events (Sunstein and Kuran ). Precaution is an eff ort to foresee and prevent 
such risks before they occur. On the other side of the same coin, RIA is an eff ort 
to foresee the impacts of risk regulatory policies and ensure they are desirable. 
Meanwhile, policy diff usion itself can be vulnerable to the availability heuristic if 
policymakers adopt what they happen to see rather than what careful study would 
recommend (Elkins and Simmons ). 
 Regulatory foresight is increasingly demanded as societies prosper and, ironi-
cally, as they become safer. Increased demand for regulation is spurred by fac-
tors including prosperity, impersonal commerce, advancing science, crisis events, 
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and rising safety itself. Prosperity reduces immediate risks to survival and extends 
longevity. But prosperity also feeds a rising demand for amenities such as envi-
ronmental quality and risk protection, enhances the scientifi c methods used to 
detect more subtle and latent risks, and brings new technologies that reduce some 
risks but may create new risks. Th ese factors help explain the increasing demand 
for precautionary policies in prosperous, safer countries—a phenomenon criti-
cized by Wildavsky (), but perhaps understandable if demand for risk protec-
tion increases with income. Lower risk and greater longevity might also shift  the 
demand for risk protection toward greater emphasis on latent risks, because even 
though greater longevity refl ects decreasing risks, longer life spans may also lead 
people to care more about risks that may arise farther into the future. And, in a 
decreasing-risk world, those risks that do occur may be seen as more unusual and 
more outrageous by the public, spurring greater demand for protective measures 
(Godard et al. , ). 
 But precautionary regulations to reduce those risks can impose their own 
costs and ancillary impacts (risk-risk trade-off s) (Wiener ). Hence the rising 
demand for RIA—a companion form of foresight. International diff usion of RIA 
and ROBs are manifestations of the demand for regulatory foresight. 
 As a society becomes even safer through the joint eff ects of prosperity, pre-
caution, and better regulation, that society may come to confront even lower-
probability, higher-consequence risks—extreme catastrophic risks that would 
otherwise escape attention but that could be highly worth preventing (Posner 
; Sunstein ). Scientifi c detection capabilities improve with prosperity 
and continuing research. Longer life spans mean that extreme risks become more 
plausible within one’s own lifetime and the lifetime of one’s children and grand-
children. And the bequest value to the living of protecting future generations 
may increase with wealth, safety, and foresight. (Whereas the Environmental 
Kuznets Curve hypothesis suggests that pollution levels would rise and then 
fall as a society becomes ever wealthier, this risk-prosperity-foresight hypoth-
esis suggests that risks would shift  toward the tail of remote risks as a society 
prospers and reduces familiar risks.) But these extreme risks may nonetheless 
go neglected where they are so rare that no present or memorable incident trig-
gers the “availability” heuristic (Weber ). Furthermore, catastrophic risks 
may be neglected where the losses would be so large that the public becomes 
numb to their magnitude (Slovic ), and where the catastrophe would wipe 
out the very institutions meant to provide remedies and ex post sanctions (thus 
weakening ex ante incentives for prevention). Th ese are “tragedies of the uncom-
mons” (Wiener ; Wiener ), and they pose the strongest case for precau-
tion. Still, precaution against tragedies of the uncommons must confront the 
twin challenges of priority-setting (choosing which extreme scenario to address, 
even as such scenarios multiply when the probability worth worrying about 
becomes ever smaller) and risk-risk trade-off s (because measures to prevent one 
catastrophic risk might induce another). Th us, even in cases where precaution is 
strongly warranted against uncertain catastrophic risks, the full foresight of RIA 
remains crucial. 
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 To succeed, societies must manage both emerging risks (through precaution) 
and the ancillary impacts of their own risk protection measures (through impact 
assessment). 
 Both are forms of foresight. Th e international diff usion of these strategies 
enables more countries to take advantage of their benefi ts, and enables researchers 
to study variations across countries from which we can learn and improve such 
policies. Both hybridization and regulatory foresight are essential strategies for 
risk management in a changing world. But diff usion can go awry if policymakers 
are not good students or are not well informed about other policy measures and 
impacts (Elkins and Simmons ). To make the most of these strategies, we 
should consciously construct a global policy laboratory (Greenstone ; Wiener 
)—which in turn involves a bit of regulatory hindsight. We will need ex post 
evaluation of regulatory policies and of the diff usion of regulatory oversight sys-
tems, in order to see what diff erence those policies and oversight systems actually 
make (Coglianese and Bennear ). Th ese retrospective assessments will help us 
revise those policies and oversight systems, foster smarter diff usion, and improve 
our methods of ex ante prospective regulatory foresight and policy choice. 
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